The Essence Test: Picking Up a Supreme Court Fumble by Thomas Gentry
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 67 
Issue 4 Fall 2018 Article 9 
12-19-2018 
The Essence Test: Picking Up a Supreme Court Fumble 
Thomas Gentry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas Gentry, The Essence Test: Picking Up a Supreme Court Fumble, 67 Cath. U. L. Rev. 737 (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol67/iss4/9 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
The Essence Test: Picking Up a Supreme Court Fumble 
Erratum 
corrected header 
This comments is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol67/iss4/9 
 737 
THE ESSENCE TEST: PICKING UP A SUPREME 
COURT FUMBLE 
Thomas Gentry 
Labor arbitration continues to be “the primary method utilized by public and 
private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the workplace under 
labor agreements,”1 even though it has been nearly sixty years since the United 
States Supreme Court first enunciated its guiding principles and the grounds for 
vacatur of labor arbitration.2  Viewed in the context of the Labor Management 
Relations Act3 (LMRA), this reality becomes especially problematic.  The 
LMRA contains no specific grounds for vacatur of arbitration awards,4 and is 
therefore dependent upon the Supreme Court to have any teeth.  This has been 
an area, however, where the Supreme Court has fumbled repeatedly.  The 
Supreme Court’s missteps are most apparent under the “essence test,”5 a 
judicially created remedy that losing parties to an arbitration dispute often plead 
in the hopes that a reviewing court will vacate the arbitration award.6 
The essence test is a common law mechanism created by the Supreme Court 
in the Steelworker Trilogy7 cases to enable a judge to vacate an arbitration award 
that fails to “draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.”8  
Multiple circuits have attempted to articulate when an arbitration award fails to 
draw its essence from the agreement, without a single interpretation appearing 
                                                 
 J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., The Catholic 
University of America, 2015.  I would like to thank Professor Frederick Woods for his expertise 
and guidance throughout the formulation of this paper.  I would also like to thank Professor 
Megan La Belle and the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their review 
of this paper.  All errors are my own. 
 1.  A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration , AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION at  1, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/grievance_arbi
tration.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).  
 2. See infra Section III.A (discussing the Steelworker Trilogy cases decided in 1960). 
 3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012). 
 4. Infra Section II.A. 
 5. See infra Section III.B. 
 6. See Jonathan R. Waldron, Vacatur of Labor Arbitration Awards: Watering Down the 
Supreme Court’s “Drawn from the Essence” Precedent May Sound the Death Knell for Labor 
Arbitration, 2005 J. DISP . RESOL. 539, 544 (discussing losing parties’ use of the essence test and 
various courts’ willingness to reach the underlying merits of the case when reviewing a labor 
arbitration award). 
 7. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
 8. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597. 
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to lead the way.9  Circuits have stated that an award fails to draw its essence 
from the agreement when it is “unfounded in reason and fact,”10 when the award 
is “completely irrational,”11 or when the arbitrator is not “arguably construing 
or applying the contract.”12  But these attempts to make the essence test a usable 
standard have proven to be unsuccessful.13 
In practice, courts have used one of these various interpretations of the essence 
test to necessarily review the merits of arbitration awards.14  But under the 
guiding principles of the Steelworker Trilogy cases, courts are forbidden to 
review the merits of arbitration awards.15  The issue facing the courts directly 
relates to the incompatibility of these two judicial principles: allowing vacaturs 
that do not draw their essence from the agreement, yet simultaneously 
demanding a court refrain from reviewing the merits of that arbitration award. 
This Comment will discuss the paradox of these two judicial mandates within 
the context of the Adrian Peterson arbitration appeal through the district court16 
and appellate court.17  This Comment will examine the development of the 
essence test in the United States Supreme Court and various circuit courts, as 
well as the Supreme Court’s preference against review of the merits of 
arbitration awards.  Then, this Comment will demonstrate that the essence test 
and the Supreme Court’s prohibition of merit review of arbitration awards are 
conflicting ideas, which require a limited exception to become compatible.  This 
Comment concludes by providing a solution to this conflict: through a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA), parties could contractually agree to expand the 
scope of judicial review to include errors of law or fact, thereby enabling courts 
to determine that an arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the 
agreement if an arbitrator commits an error of law or fact.  Alternatively, this 
                                                 
 9. See Waldron, supra note 6 at 546–49 (describing different approaches taken to 
determining whether an arbitration award derives its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 10. Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods., Ltd. P ’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 11. Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Comedy Club, Inc. v. 
Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1227, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
 12. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 984, No. 
90-5933, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760, at *11 (6th  Cir. Oct. 10, 1991) (quoting United 
Paperworkers Int ’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
 13. See infra Section III.C. 
 14. See infra Section III.C; see also Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. 
v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985) (“This court may engage in a 
substantive review of the award only to determine whether the award is unfounded in reason and 
fact . . . .  In such cases, the award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement 
and must be overturned.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 15. See infra Part IV (noting that public policy favors the finality of arbitration and, therefore, 
a judicial rule forbidding courts to review the merit s of arbitration awards). 
 16. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 17. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d at 985. 
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result could be accomplished through legislation: amending the LMRA to 
provide for explicit grounds for vacatur. 
Part I describes the background facts of the Peterson case and the role of the 
essence test throughout that case.  Part II discusses the LMRA, its impact upon 
suits to vacate arbitration awards, and a shift in judicial opinion toward favoring 
labor arbitration.  Part III reviews the Steelworker Trilogy cases and describes 
the essence test in detail, including the conflicting interpretations by the circuit 
courts.  Part IV suggests that collective bargaining could cure problems 
surrounding the essence test.  Part V proposes that, in the alternative, Congress 
could negate the need for the essence test by enacting specific grounds for 
vacatur similar to the Federal Arbitration Act.  Finally, Part VI demonstrates that 
the growing popularity of labor arbitration requires a resolution of the essence 
test and the merit review paradox. 
I. THE ADRIAN PETERSON CASE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE ESSENCE TEST  
Adrian Peterson grabbed a “switch”18 and “struck [his] child repeatedly.”19  
The Minnesota Vikings’ star running back, and one of the National Football 
League’s most accomplished players,20 was charged with “reckless or negligent 
injury to a child” in 2014.21  This incident involving Peterson’s four-year-old 
son became front-page news.22  As the story became widely reported, Peterson 
faced disciplinary action from NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell.23 
                                                 
 18. A “switch,” as it  is used in the context of the Peterson case, is a small tree branch 
traditionally used in disciplining a child.  Ryan Wilson, Adrian Peterson Indicted in Child Injury 
Case in Texas, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/adrian-peterson-
indicted-in-child-injury-case-in-texas/. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Adrian Peterson was the seventh pick overall in the 2007 NFL draft.  He is a seven time 
Pro Bowl Player, four time First -team All-Pro player, three time Second-Team All-Pro player, 2012 
NFL Most Valuable Player, 2012 NFL Offensive Player of the Year, 2012 NFL Comeback Player 
of the Year, two time Bert Bell Award Winner, 2007 NFL Offensive Rookie of the Year, three-
time NFL rushing yards leader, two-time NFL rushing touchdowns leader, and holds the NFL 
record for most rushing yards in a single game. Adrian Peterson, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE 
https://www.pro-football-reference.com/players/P/PeteAd01.htm (last visited April 6, 2018).  
 21. Wilson, supra note 16.  Peterson’s reckless assault case was heard in Montgomery 
County, Texas in front of District Judge Kelly Case.  Peterson Enters No Contest Plea , ESPN (Nov. 
5, 2014), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11819670/adrian-peterson-minnesota-vikings-enter-
plea-lesser-charge-felony-child-abuse-charge-avoid-jail. 
 22. See Wilson, supra note 18; Ben Estes, Vikings RB Adrian Peterson Pleads No Contest to 
Misdemeanor in Child Abuse Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.si.com/nfl/2014/11/04/adrian-peterson-minnesota-vikings-trial-plea.  Peterson’s son’s 
doctor initially reported that “ the boy had a number of lacerations on his thighs, along with bruise-
like marks on his lower back and buttocks and cuts on his hand.”  Wilson, supra note 18.  
Apparently, Peterson’s son pushed his sibling off of a motorbike video game, at which time 
Peterson grabbed a thin tree branch referred to as a “switch” and “discipline[d]” the boy.  Id. 
 23. See Conor Orr, Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay For Rest of ‘14, AROUND THE 
NFL (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:54 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000430302/article/adrian 
-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-rest-of-14. 
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The NFL is not new to player discipline and subsequent labor arbitration. 24  
Just prior to the Peterson incident, the NFL completed its handling of the highly 
publicized disciplinary proceeding involving former Baltimore Ravens’ running 
back Ray Rice, after a video surfaced of Rice knocking his then-girlfriend 
unconscious in an elevator.25  Like Ray Rice, Adrian Peterson’s disciplinary 
action for “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the 
game of professional football” would go to arbitration, pursuant to the NFL’s 
Collective Bargaining Agreement.26 
After playing only one game in the 2014 season, Peterson was placed on the 
Commissioner’s Exempt List.27  While on the Exempt List, the NFL issued a 
                                                 
 24. Over the last few years, there have been several recent high-profile arbitration cases 
arising from NFL player discipline. For example, after the 2015 AFC Championship Game, which 
became known as “Deflate Gate,” New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady received a four-
game suspension for deflating footballs.  The Case for Tom Brady: An Arbitrator’s Take, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (June 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/06/10/the-case-for-tom-brady-an-arbitrators-take/?utm_term=.33ed9c363c53.  
Similarly, after a 2014 domestic violence incident,  former Carolina Panthers Defensive End Gregg 
Hardy was suspended for 10 games, subsequently reduced in arbitration to four games.  Dan 
Hanzus, Greg Hardy Suspension Reduced to Four Games, AROUND THE NFL (July 10, 2015, 2:28 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000500985/article/greg-hardy-suspension-reduced-
to-four-games. 
 25. See generally Louis Bien, A Complete Timeline of the Ray Rice Assault Case, SB NATION 
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/5/23/5744964/ray -rice-arrest-assault-
statement-apology-ravens.  On February 15, 2014, Ray Rice was arrested in Atlantic City, New 
Jersey for simple assault after he got into a fight with his then-fiancée Janay Palmer.  Id.  Roger 
Goodell suspended Rice for two games on July 24, 2015.  Id.  On September 8, 2015 TMZ released 
a surveillance video of the assault incident between Rice and Palmer, which showed Rice strike 
Palmer in the face, knocking her unconscious.  Id.  Upon seeing the video footage and after 
receiving heavy criticism from the public, Goodell amended Rice’s suspension from two games to 
an indefinite suspension.  Id. 
 26. NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 46 §1(a) at 204 (“All disputes involving 
a fine or suspension imposed upon a player for conduct on the playing field (other than as described 
in Subsection (b) below) or involving action taken against a player by the Commissioner for 
conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football, 
will be processed exclusively as follows: the Commissioner will promptly send written notice of 
his action to the player, with a copy to the NFLPA. Within three (3) business days following such 
written notification, the player affected thereby, or the NFLPA with the player ’s approval, may 
appeal in writing to the Commissioner.”). 
 27. After news of these charges came out, the Vikings placed Peterson on the 
“Commissioner’s Exempt List,” which barred Peterson from all team activities, much like a 
suspension.  Louis Bien, What is the NFL Exempt/Commissioner’s Permission List, and What Does 
it Mean for Adrian Peterson?, SB NATION (Sept. 17, 2014, 11:37 AM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/9/17/6333759/nfl-exempt-commissioners-permission-list-
explanation-adrian-peterson-greg-hardy.  To be placed on the Commissioner’s Exempt List, both 
the player and Commissioner Roger Goodell must agree.  Id.  At the time of the incident, the NFL 
player Personnel Policy Manual described the list  as follows: 
The Exempt List is a special player status available to clubs only in unusual  
circumstances.  The List includes those players who have been declared by 
the Commissioner to be temporarily exempt from counting within the Active 
List limit.  Only the Commissioner has the authority to place a player on the 
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new personal conduct policy that required a minimum six game suspension for 
first time violations involving domestic or child abuse.28 
With six weeks remaining in the season, Peterson was taken off the 
Commissioner’s Exempt List and suspended for the remainder of the season,29 
forfeiting $4.2 million in salary.30  This suspension was made pursuant to the 
NFL’s newly implemented personal conduct policy, even though the policy was 
created after the Peterson incident occurred.31  Peterson appealed the 
disciplinary decision to arbitration, and the arbitrator upheld the decision.32  A 
                                                 
Exempt List; clubs have no such authority, and no exemption, regardless of 
circumstances, is automatic.  The Commissioner also has the authority to 
determine in advance whether a player’s time on the Exempt List will be finite 
or will continue until the Commissioner deems the exemption should be lifted 
and the player returned to the Active List. 
Id. (citing NFL Player Personnel Policy Manual). 
 28. Katie Sharp, NFL Announces New Domestic Violence Policy, SB NATION (Aug. 28, 2014, 
4:06 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/8/28/6079465/n fl-announces-new-domestic-
violence-policy. 
 29. See Roger Goodell Defends Ray Rice Ban , ESPN (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/11296028/roger-goodell-defends-suspension-ray-rice-
baltimore-ravens-running-back.  There was speculation that the severity of Peterson’s punishment 
was largely fueled by the recent public criticism regarding the NFL’s handling of the Ray Rice 
incident.  See id. (“Goodell also fielded multiple questions about the widespread public reaction to 
the length of Rice’s suspension, which has been criticized as lenient compared with other NFL 
suspensions for substance abuse and off-field incidents.”); see also Steve Almasy & Ashley Fantz, 
NFL Chief Roger Goodell Faces Intense Criticism After Ray Rice Video , CNN (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/09/us/nfl-ray-rice-criticism/ (“Outspoken ESPN personality Keith 
Olbermann called Goodell an ‘enabler of men who beat women’ and demanded the commissioner 
resign or be fired.”). 
 30. Orr, supra note 23.  After playing in the season opener, Peterson was placed on the 
“Commissioner’s Exempt List” while awaiting discipline from the NFL.  Id.  While on this list , 
Peterson was able to collect a salary, but could have no participation in any team activities.  After 
spending some time on the Commissioner’s Exempt List, Goodell ultimately decided to remove 
Peterson from the List and suspended him for the remainder of the season, approximately six games.  
Id. 
 31. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 985 (8th Cir. 2016) (“There is 
no dispute that the Commissioner imposed Peterson ’s discipline under the New Policy.”); rev’d 
and remanded, NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015). 
 32. Peterson’s disciplinary appeal was heard by arbitrator Harold Henderson, who served as 
an Executive for the NFL from 1991 through 2012.  Mr. Henderson served as the NFL ’s Executive 
Vice President for Labor Relations for a span of sixteen years, and as Chairman of the NFL 
Management Council Executive Committee.  He also served as the NFL’s Executive Vice President 
for Player Development.  Redacted Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award, National Football League 
Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. National Football League, No. 0:14-cv-04990-DSD-JSM, 2014 
WL 7145640, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2014).  In addition, Mr. Henderson served as arbitrator over 
the Cowboys’ defensive end Greg Hardy’s appeal in 2015.  Mark Maske, NFL Appoints Harold 
Henderson to Resolve Greg Hardy’s Appeal, T HE WASHINGTON POST (May 7, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/05/07/nfl-appoints-harold-henderson-to-
resolve-greg-hardys-appeal/?utm_term=.74f73f42b6c0. 
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second appeal was filed with the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota, where Judge David Doty overturned the arbitration award.33 
Judge Doty overturned the arbitrator’s decision to uphold Goodell’s award, 
claiming that the award “fail[ed] to draw its essence from the [collective 
bargaining agreement],” because arbitrator Henderson ignored the “law of the 
shop” when he retroactively applied the new personal conduct policy to 
Peterson.34  Judge Doty found that the Rice decision unequivocally established 
that the Commissioner cannot retroactively enforce the new personal conduct 
policy against Peterson’s conduct before the creation of that policy.35  According 
to Judge Doty, the Rice decision became the “law of the shop,” and the 
Commissioner ignored the law of the shop; therefore, the suspension did not 
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.36  Contrary to the 
Peterson arbitrator, Judge Doty found that the Peterson case was 
indistinguishable from the Rice case.37 
Despite Judge Doty’s decision, the Eighth Circuit overruled the District Court 
and reinstated the arbitration award—finding that Judge Doty incorrectly 
applied the essence test—and reiterated that judges are forbidden to review the 
merits of an arbitration award.38  Judge Colloton of the Eighth Circuit stated, 
“The dispositive question is whether the arbitrator was at least arguably 
construing or applying the contract, including the law of shop.  The arbitrator 
here undoubtedly construed the Rice decision in reaching his decision.”39 
Judge Colloton reiterated the guiding principles from the Steelworker Trilogy 
cases, including the deference that judges should give to arbitration, stating “[i]n 
an arbitration case like this one, the role of the courts is very limited,” and 
“[c]ourts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitration decision even 
when a party claims that the decision rests on factual errors.”40  Furthermore, the 
Judge stated that “[a]n erroneous interpretation of a contract, including the law 
of the shop, is not a sufficient basis for disregarding the conclusion of the 
decisionmaker chosen by the parties.”41  Judge Colloton found that the District 
                                                 
 33. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
 34. Id.  “Retroactive application” in this situation means applying the New Personal Conduct 
Policy to conduct done before the Policy was created.  See generally id. 
 35. Id. at  1090 (“ It is also undisputed that in the Rice arbitration, [Judge Jones] unequivocally 
recognized that the New Policy cannot be applied retroactively.”). 
 36. Id. at  1091 (“Henderson simply disregarded the law of the shop and in doing so failed to 
meet his duty under the CBA.  As a result, the arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the 
CBA and vacatur is warranted.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2016).  
 39. Id. at  994. 
 40. Id. at  993, 995. 
 41. Id. at  994. 
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Court could not vacate the arbitration award because it disagreed with the 
arbitrator that the Rice and Peterson cases were distinguishable.42 
The Peterson case is just another example in a long line of cases that differ on 
the application of the essence test and the courts’ unsanctioned attempts to use 
that test to review the merits of an arbitration award.43  To fully understand the 
paradox that these judicial mandates present, it is necessary to review the 
development of the LMRA and the development of the Supreme Court’s attitude 
towards arbitration disputes brought under the LMRA. 
II. THE COURT’S TRANSITION TO A PREFERENCE FOR ARBITRATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC GROUNDS FOR VACATUR OF LABOR ARBITRATION 
AWARDS 
A. The Labor Management Relations Act and Federal Arbitration Act as 
Applied to Labor Disputes 
The traditional view is that labor disputes, meaning disputes involving labor 
unions44 and management over collective bargaining agreements, are primarily 
governed by the LMRA.45  Accordingly, many courts have held that such labor 
disputes were not within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act46 (FAA).47  The 
FAA governs most “contracts of employment”48 that contain pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate claims arising out of one’s employment. The Supreme 
Court, however, distinguished contracts of employment from collective 
bargaining agreements.49  Nevertheless, the FAA continues to be a factor in labor 
                                                 
 42. Id.  Judge Colloton acknowledged that, during arbitration, the arbitrator addressed Rice 
“head-on” and “explained that Rice involved second discipline imposed on a player for conduct 
that was already subject to a suspension and fine, whereas Peterson ’s sanction was the first  
discipline imposed.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 43. See infra Section III.C. 
 44. The National Football League Players Association, which brings claims on behalf of 
players, is a labor union.  See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 831 F.3d at 989. 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
 46. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
 47. Jay E. Grenig, et al., “It’s not Over ‘Til It’s Over”: After the Arbitration Award in Sports 
Arbitration, 70 DISP . RESOL. J. 21, 26 (2015); see, e.g., United Paperworkers Int ’l Union, AFL-
CIO, et al. v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987) (“The [Federal] Arbitration Act does not apply 
to ‘contracts of employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce ’”); Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“We hold that in cases brought under . . . the Labor Management Relations Act . . . the FAA 
does not apply.”). 
 48. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115, 119 (2001) (holding that 9 U.S.C. 
§ 1 exempts only contracts of employment involving transportation wo rkers and not all contracts 
of employment). 
 49. In J.I. Chase Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court determined that a collective bargaining 
agreement could be considered a contract of employment only in “ rare cases.”  321 U.S. 332, 335 
(1944).  The Court reasoned that “no one has a job by reason of [a collective bargaining agreement] 
and no obligation to any individual ordinarily comes into existence from it  alone.”  Id. 
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arbitration to the extent that it may provide guidance to courts reviewing 
arbitration under the LMRA.50  The LMRA provides for labor disputes to be 
submitted “in any district court of the United States.”51  The LMRA does not 
provide various procedures to compel arbitration, nor does it provide specific 
grounds for vacatur of arbitration decisions.52  This is a significant difference 
between the LMRA and the FAA.  The FAA contains statutory grounds for 
vacatur, including: 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the 
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone 
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear 
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any 
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not 
made.53 
Conspicuously, the FAA does not contain a ground for vacatur that is 
specifically based on the merit of an arbitration award.54  Since the LMRA does 
not contain similar statutory grounds to guide judges in their review of 
arbitration awards, case law developed to grant the courts jurisdiction to enforce 
or vacate an arbitration award.55  But early American courts looked upon 
                                                 
 50. David L. Benetar, Arbitration of a Labor Dispute-Management Representation , 11 AM. 
JR. T RIALS 327, § 1 (2018) (“Although [the] Federal Arbitration Act is formally inapplicable to 
labor arbitration, [the] Act is used as [a] source of principles to guide formulation of federal 
common law of labor arbitration”). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, 
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States 
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to 
the citizenship of the parties.”). 
 52. See id. 
 53. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)(4). 
 54. Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening 
the Law of Labor Arbitration , 21 BERKELEY J. EMP . & LAB. L. 521, 563 (2000) (“The wording of, 
and the narrow grounds for vacatur prescribed by, § 10(a) of the FAA do not contemplate any 
judicial intrusion into the merits of challenged arbitration awards.”). 
 55. See Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1503 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (“A suit to throw out a labor arbitrator’s award is . . . a suit  to enforce the labor contract 
that contained the clause authorizing the arbitration of disputes arising out of the contract.  For in 
arguing against the award, the plaintiff normally will be pointing to implicit  or explicit  limits that 
the contract places on the arbitrator’s authority—principally that he was to interpret the contract 
and not go off on a frolic of his own—and arguing that the arbitrator exceeded those limits.”). 
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arbitration with disfavor, and the first significant shift was not until 1957 with 
the case of Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills.56 
B. Early Interactions of Arbitration and Judicial Review 
The judicial position on the institution of labor arbitration has seen a radical 
shift since the founding of the nation.57  Prior to the American court system, 
English common law viewed arbitration as an unwarranted usurpation of judicial 
review.58  This English common law sentiment was adopted by the early 
American court system.59  The early courts highly disfavored agreements that 
“oust[ed] the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law.”60  The early courts saw 
that every citizen had a “substantial right[]” to “resort to all the courts of the 
country, and to invoke the protection which all the laws or all those courts may 
afford him.”61 
In fact, traditional courts were so hostile towards arbitration that either party 
could “disavow the agreement [to arbitrate] prior to the actual arbitration,”62 
which became known as the “revocability doctrine.”63  The revocability doctrine 
made it nearly impossible for a party to ask a court to compel arbitration.64  The 
early American courts saw this hostility towards arbitration too firmly rooted in 
the common law for them to overturn.65  Although the early courts did not favor 
arbitration, and even allowed parties to revoke their arbitration agreements, the 
courts were not willing to second-guess the arbitrator’s decision once the parties 
submitted their disputes.66  Even though the general judicial opinion of 
arbitration has seen a shift, the notion that judges should not second-guess an 
arbitrator’s decision as to the merits of the claim has remained consistent.  
                                                 
 56. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
 57. See FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 1 (4th ed. 
1999).  State and federal courts initially viewed labor arbitration as a competing institution of 
dispute resolution and  judges were less likely to accommodate labor arbitration because, in their 
view, there was strong public policy favoring the intervention of the courts.  Id. 
 58. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (noting that there 
was a “ longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . at  English common law”). 
 59. Id. (“ [The FAA’s] purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts.”). 
 60. Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874). 
 61. Id. 
 62. David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP . & LAB. L. 296, 301 (1998). 
 63. Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 9899 (2012). 
 64. Id. at  98. 
 65. Id. at  101 n.47 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 68–96, at 1 (1924)). 
 66. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Arbitral Injustice—Rethinking the Manifest Disregard 
Standard for Judicial Review of Awards, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 291 (2007); see also Brush 
v. Fisher, 38 N.W. 446, 448 (1888) (“[I]t  is evident that there are great objections to any general 
interference by courts with awards.”). 
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The American courts began to reject the view that arbitration should be 
disfavored in 1957 with the Lincoln Mills case.67  By 1960, in the Steelworker 
Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court stated that labor arbitration should not be 
subject to the same hostility as other types of arbitration.68 
C. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills  
In the Lincoln Mills case, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that 
federal law would govern suits under the LMRA.69  This enabled federal courts 
to interpret the LMRA, to compel arbitration if agreed to in a collective 
bargaining agreement, and to create binding case law to establish grounds for 
vacatur.  This case initiated a shift to a preference for arbitration, rather than 
judicial hostility towards it.70  In fact, the Supreme Court made its position 
favoring arbitration even more clear just a few years later in the Steelworker 
Trilogy cases.71 
III. THE STEELWORKER TRILOGY CASES AND THE CREATION OF THE ESSENCE 
TEST  
A. The Steelworker Trilogy Cases and the Favor of Arbitration in Labor 
Disputes 
The Steelworker Trilogy cases were a series of disputes arising from the 
arbitration between the Steelworker’s Union and their employers.72  These cases 
formed the basis of the current jurisprudence regarding judicial review of labor 
arbitration.  Most notably, these cases demonstrate a shift away from court 
hostility towards labor arbitration and towards courts favoring labor arbitration. 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,73 a 
group of steelworkers performed maintenance and repair work on a barge 
located in Chickasaw, Alabama.74  The owner of the barge terminated nineteen 
steelworkers, instead hiring other companies to perform the bulk of its 
                                                 
 67. Feller, supra note 62, at 300.  David Feller briefed Lincoln Mills and argued the 
Steelworker Trilogy cases and recalled that at the time of briefing Lincoln Mills arbitration was still 
not favored.  Id. at  299 n.13, 300 n.23. 
 68. See infra Section III.A. 
 69. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).  
 70. Feller, supra note 62, at 301 (“So, as of 1957 with Lincoln Mills and as of 1960 with the 
Steelworkers Trilogy, arbitration was in a preferred, if not exalted, status.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. The Steelworker Trilogy cases were each decided on the same day, June 20, 1960.  See 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);  United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
 73. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
 74. Id. at  575. 
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maintenance work.75  These newly contracted companies then hired some of the 
recently terminated steelworkers to perform the maintenance work on the barge, 
but at reduced wages.76  The Steelworkers Union filed a grievance with the barge 
employer, claiming that the company was “arbitrarily and unreasonably 
contracting out work . . . that could and previously ha[d] been performed by 
Company employees.”77  The Steelworkers Union and the employer had a 
collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of this type of dispute 
so, after the employer refused to arbitrate, the Steelworkers Union petitioned the 
District Court of Alabama to compel arbitration.78 
After the District Court and Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the employer, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and, ultimately, compelled arbitration.79  The 
Court unequivocally stated that public policy favors arbitration.80  In stating that 
public policy favors arbitration, the Court made a point to recognize the previous 
opposition of the courts towards arbitration.81  The Court justified its view of 
public policy by drawing a distinction between labor arbitration and other forms 
of arbitration, stating, “Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite different 
functions from arbitration under an ordinary commercial agreement, the hostility 
evinced by courts toward arbitration of commercial agreements has no place 
here.  For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is 
part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.”82  The Court noted 
that the collective bargaining agreement created a new “common law of a 
particular industry.”83 
In United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,84 the 
Supreme Court continued to favor arbitration of labor disputes and expanded its 
application.  In Enterprise Wheel, a group of steelworkers left their job in protest 
of one of their co-workers termination.85  At the recommendation of a union 
                                                 
 75. Id.  Between 1956 and 1958, the barge owner terminated almost half of its workforce.  Id.  
The steelworker bargaining unit was reduced from 42 men to 23 men.  Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at  577. 
 79. Id. at  577–78, 585 (finding that pursuant to section 301 of the LMRA, and pursuant to 
Lincoln Mills, a court may enforce an arbitration provision contained in a collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 80. Id. at  578 (“The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the 
collective bargaining agreement.  A major factor in achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a 
provision for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.  “One cannot reduce all the rules governing a community like an industrial plant to 
fifteen or even fifty pages.  Within the sphere of  collective bargaining, the institutional 
characteristics and the governmental nature of the collective-bargaining process demand a common 
law of the shop which implements and furnishes the context of the agreement.”  Id. at 579–80. 
 84. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 85. Id. at  595. 
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representative, the steelworkers asked for permission to return to work. 86  An 
official of the employer initially agreed, but later rescinded the offer. 87  The 
dispute went to arbitration, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, and 
the arbitrator found that the steelworkers should be reinstated.88  The employer 
refused to comply with the decision of the arbitrator, and the Steelworkers Union 
petitioned the court to enforce the decision.89  The District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia ordered the employer to comply with the arbitration 
award, but on appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated the award.90 
The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals, but agreed that 
the District Court judgement “should be modified so that the amounts due the 
employees may be definitely determined by arbitration.”91  In addition, the Court 
reiterated its holding that a court may not review the merits of an arbitration 
award.92  While the Steelworker Trilogy cases evinced a shift towards favoring 
arbitration, it was clear that the longstanding judicial policy to refrain from 
second-guessing arbitrators would remain fundamental.  The Court reasoned 
“[t]he federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be 
undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.”93  The Court 
also emphasized the importance of the arbitrator’s judgment when it comes to 
issuing a remedy, and indicated that the courts should defer to the arbitrator’s 
judgment because he is a professional with working knowledge of the industry.94 
In the last of the Steelworker Trilogy cases, United Steelworkers of America 
v. American Manufacturing Co.,95 the Court was asked, once again, to compel 
arbitration.96  A steelworker in that case left his job due to an injury.97  Some 
weeks later, the Steelworkers Union filed a grievance claiming that the 
                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at  595. The arbitrator found that discharge was not justified, and that, in view of the 
facts, a 10-day suspension was more appropriate.  The arbitrator ordered reinstatement of the 
employees, plus back pay, but minus pay equal to a 10-day suspension.  Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at  595–96.  The Fourth Circuit vacated parts of the arbitration award because, between 
the termination of the employees and the conclusion of arbitration, the collective bargaining 
agreement expired.  The Fourth Circuit reasoned, among other things, that reinstatement of the 
steelworkers was not unenforceable because the collective bargaining agreement expired.  Enter. 
Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 269 F.2d 327, 331 –32 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. 
granted, Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.  This argument was used at arbitration as well, 
but the arbitrator rejected the argument.  Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 595. 
 91. Id. at  599. 
 92. Id. at  596 (“The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper 
approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at  596–98. 
 95. 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
 96. Id. at  564. 
 97. Id. at  566. 
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steelworker was entitled to return to work.98  Once the employer refused to 
arbitrate the dispute, the union asked the Court to compel arbitration.99 
Keeping in line with the previous Steelworker cases, the Court again affirmed 
the policy favoring arbitration and enumerated more standards that would 
confine the courts’ abilities to review the merits of the arbitration award.100  The 
Court stated, “[w]hether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of 
contract interpretation for the arbitrator,” and that the “function of the court is 
very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract 
interpretation to the arbitrator.”101 
The Steelworker Trilogy cases exemplified the Supreme Court’s position on 
judicial review of arbitration in these areas.  First, the Court noted its public 
policy interests, finding that it weighed heavily in favor of the arbitration of labor 
disputes agreed to in collective bargaining agreements.  Second, the Court stated 
the limits that reviewing courts were bound by when arbitration was freely 
bargained for in a collective bargaining agreement.  Third, the Court 
underscored its prior holding that no vacatur of arbitration awards based on the 
merits of the award would remain good law.  Thus, while the Steelworker 
Trilogy cases greatly restricted judicial review of arbitration awards, the Court 
left open some narrow avenues to allow a court to vacate an arbitration award.  
B. Arbitration Awards Must Draw Their “Essence from the Contract” 
In Enterprise Wheel, the Court made clear its intention of favoring 
arbitration.102  The Court emphasized the need for the arbitrator to have 
flexibility in determining the arbitration award.103  The Court reasoned that 
flexibility was important because, “[t]he draftsmen may never have thought of 
what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.”104  
But, at the same time, the Court recognized the necessity of some safeguards, to 
ensure that an arbitrator “does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial 
justice.”105 
To prevent arbitrators from going rogue, the Enterprise Wheel Court stated 
that an arbitration award may be vacated if it fails to “draw[] its essence from 
the collective bargaining agreement.”106  Thus, if such an award does not draw 
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, then the award cannot 
                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at  569. 
 101. Id. at  567–68.  The Court stated that in circumstances of a collective bargaining agreement 
which required arbitration of an issue, the parties were bound by the arbitrator ’s judgment because 
that was what was bargained for.  See id. at  568. 
 102. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).  
 103. Id. at  597. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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stand.107  This judicial formulation became known as the “essence test” and 
continues to be used as one of the primary mechanisms for courts to review 
arbitration awards under the LMRA.108 
Twenty-seven years after the essence test was first promulgated in the 
Steelworker Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court addressed the essence test again 
in United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc..109  The 
Court reaffirmed the basic formulation of the essence test—an arbitration award 
may be vacated if it does not draw its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement and if the arbitrator is dispensing his “own brand of industrial 
justice”—but said little else to clarify the essence test.110  While the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the essence test, it also reaffirmed its policy of favoring 
arbitration and prohibiting courts to review the merits of an award.111 
These two positions, refusing to review the merits of an arbitration award, 
while also providing the ability to vacate an award that fails to draw its essence 
from the agreement, are seemingly contrary.112  This appears to be a paradox, 
because how can a court determine that an award does not draw its essence from 
the agreement without reviewing the merits of that award?  This problem is 
evident by the divided interpretations of the circuit courts on how to apply the 
essence test.113 
C. How Other Circuits Have Interpreted the Essence Test 
Some circuit and lower courts have interpreted the essence test differently, 
resulting in varying interpretations.114  For example, in the First Circuit, an 
arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the contract when it is 
“unfounded in reason and fact.”115  The Ninth Circuit created a variation of the 
                                                 
 107. Id. (“ [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective 
bargaining agreement; he does not sit  to dispense his own brand of indust rial justice.  He may of 
course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it  draws 
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.  When the arbitrator ’s words manifest an 
infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.”). 
 108. Waldron, supra note 6, at 553–54. 
 109. United Paperworks Int ’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc, 484 U.S 29, 36 (1987). 
 110. Id. (“As long as the arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement, and is not merely his own brand of industrial justice, the award is legitimate.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 111. Id. (“The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the 
parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.”). 
 112. Waldron, supra note 6, at 539 (arguing that “many circuit courts have subtly refused to 
restrain their desire to vacate labor arbitrator’s awards with which they disagree by developing tests 
that water down the Supreme Court ’s ‘drawn from the essence’ precedent.”). 
 113. See infra Section III.C. 
 114. Bret F.  Randall, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards 
of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759, 762 (noting that “ lower courts have 
developed numerous variations of the essence of the contract standard”). 
 115. Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P ’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 334 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Hoteles 
Condado Beach, La Concha and Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 
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essence test to allow vacatur of an award if it is “completely irrational.”116  The 
Third Circuit finds that an award draws its essence from the agreement when the 
award “can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light 
of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention.”117  
The Sixth Circuit finds that an award draws its essence from the agreement when 
the arbitrator is plausibly or arguably construing the contract.118  The Eleventh 
and Fifth Circuits find that an arbitration award fails to draw its essence from 
the agreement when the award is “arbitrary and capricious” and has no basis in 
the “letter or purpose” of the collective bargaining agreement.119  The Eighth 
Circuit, in Bureau of Engraving Inc. v. Graphic Communications International 
Union, Local 1B,120 interpreted the essence test to include “not only . . . express 
provisions, but also . . . the industrial common law.”121  The Eighth Circuit noted 
that the common law of the shop included “past practices of the industry . . . as 
well as the parties’ negotiating history and other extrinsic evidence of their 
intent.”122  The Eighth Circuit then went on to say that an award must stand when 
an arbitrator is “arguably construing or applying the [Collective Bargaining 
Agreement].”123 
                                                 
38 (1st Cir. 1985) (“This court may engage in a substantive review of the award only to determine 
whether the award is unfounded in reason and fact  . . . .  In such cases, the award fails to draw its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement and must be overturned.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted)). 
 116. Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009) (“An award may be vacated if it  
is completely irrational.  This standard is extremely narrow and is satisfied only where [the 
arbitration decision] fails to draw its essence from the agreement.” (brackets in original) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)); see also Holly Sugar Corp. v. Distillery, Rectifying, Wine & 
Allied Workers Int ’l. Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding that an arbitration award 
draws its essence from the agreement when “ the award represents a plausible interpretation of the 
contract”). 
 117. Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280 
(3d Cir. 2004). 
 118. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 
984, No. 90-5933, 1991 WL 203110 *1, *3–*4 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 119. Loveless v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 1982).  See also Ainsworth 
v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992) (“ [A]n award that is arbitrary or capricious is not 
required to be enforced.”); Safeway Stores v. Am. Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int’l. Union, 
Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[I]f the award is arbitrary, capricious or not adequately 
grounded in the basic collective bargaining contract, it  will not be enforced by the courts.  This was 
a reflection of similar [Steelworker] trilogy comments.”). 
 120. 164 F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 121. Id.  In this case, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the arbitration award failed to draw its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement based off the industrial common law and the 
parties’ intent.  The court noted that the evidence showed that the parties discussed a monetary 
remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, but intentionally chose not to include it.  
Because the parties intentionally chose not to include the monetary provision in the collective 
bargaining agreement, the award of monetary damages could not have drawn its essence from the 
agreement.  Id. at  429–30. 
 122. Id. at  429. 
 123. Id. 
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Even though the Supreme Court has announced numerous times that 
arbitration awards should not be reviewed on their merits,124 the Eighth Circuit, 
and other circuits, have used the essence test to do just that.125  One scholar has 
summarized the circuit courts’ use of the essence test as, “[i]nstead of declining 
to weigh the merits, the Circuit Courts of Appeals are fashioning standards 
whereby a challenged award is deemed to draw its essence from the contract 
only when the reviewing court determines that it is based on an acceptably 
correct interpretation of the contract.”126 
This is possibly, at least in part, because the essence test is confusing, and 
seemingly incompatible with the Court’s wishes that lower circuits refrain from 
reviewing merits of arbitration decisions.  The Supreme Court has overturned 
circuit court decisions for misapplying the standard,127 but, despite the 
conflicting interpretations of the essence test, has yet to provide further guidance 
on the proper application of the test. 
David E. Feller, who briefed Lincoln Mills and argued the Steelworker Trilogy 
cases, highlighted the confusion surrounding the essence test in a lecture on his 
experience with arbitration litigation.128  Feller called the Supreme Court’s 
essence test an “unfortunate choice of words,” because “[o]ne man’s essence 
may be another man’s (or a court’s) nonsense!”129  Similarly, other scholars have 
criticized the circuit courts’ interpretations of the essence standard as frequently 
being too broad.130  The broadness of the essence test is adequately demonstrated 
by examining the “arguably” interpretation that is used by multiple circuits.131  
Because “arguably” is so broad, almost all arbitration awards can be said to have 
a basis in the agreement even when they are not relying on a specific provision 
of the agreement.132  In discussing an interpretation of the “arguably” standard 
applied to the essence test, one Sixth Circuit judge stated: “[T]he Court appears 
to say this: whenever it can be said by a court sitting in review that the arbitrator 
                                                 
 124. See, e.g., MLB Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001); United Paperworks 
Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc, 484 U.S 29, 36 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
 125. See Waldron, supra note 6, at  539, 546–49 (illustrating the different standards the circuits 
developed which suggests reaching the merits of arbitration.); see also T imothy J Heinsz, Judicial 
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise Wheel Goes Around and Around , 52 MO. L. 
REV. 243, 24849 (1987) (discussing the paradox that the essence test presents by requiring judges 
to consider a “myriad of factual circumstances” in order to determine when an award does not 
drawn its essence from the agreement). 
 126. Hayford, supra note 54, at 562. 
 127. See Waldron, supra note 6, at  553. 
 128. See Feller, supra note 62, at 299–302. 
 129. Id. at  302. 
 130. Randall, supra note 114, at 764. 
 131. Id. at  764–65 (discussing Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters 
Local Union No. 984, No. 90-5933, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24760, at *11 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 1991)). 
 132. Randall, supra note 114, at 764; see also Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of 
Tenn., Inc., 1991 WL 203110 at *13–14. 
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is directly (construing) or indirectly (applying) the CBA, then that court may not 
set aside an arbitrator’s decision even if the decision is manifestly erroneous.” 
This reading cannot be correct, however, as no arbitrator will ever issue a 
decision so removed from the CBA that it cannot be argued afterwards by either 
counsel or a judge that the contract played a part in the arbitrator’s decision.  The 
very fact of litigation means that someone is making that argument.133 
Clearly there is difficulty in interpreting the essence test too broadly.  And 
because the Supreme Court did not foreclose all judicial review of arbitration, it 
cannot be said that such an interpretation of the essence test is valid.  The issue 
therefore becomes how a court can determine that an arbitration award does not 
draw its essence from the agreement, without reaching the merits of the award.  
Is such a test even possible?  If the essence test is in fact incompatible with the 
policy of refraining from review of the merits of an award, what should a 
reviewing court do?  Here are some suggestions about what can be done. 
IV. CLARIFYING THE ESSENCE TEST THROUGH THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT  
A. Bargaining for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Review 
One solution to the problem of the incompatibility of these two concepts is to 
create a limited exception for courts to review the merits of those arbitration 
awards.  A contractual provision in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement 
to allow for expanded judicial review when, for instance, “the arbitrator 
committed errors of law or of fact,” could be effective.134 
Indeed, many arbitration agreements contained such provisions, but the circuit 
courts were split as to their validity.135  The Supreme Court addressed the split 
in the circuits and ultimately rejected such an attempt to circumnavigate the 
express grounds for vacatur within the context of the FAA.136  However, labor 
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is governed by the LMRA 
and not the FAA.137  The LMRA leaves open the question of whether 
contractually agreed to expanded judicial review of arbitration would be 
permissible in the labor context. 
                                                 
 133. Memphis Dist. of Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc., 1991 WL 203110 at *13. 
 134. Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 253–54 (1999). 
 135. Compare Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96–2261, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248, at *1 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995) with Kyocera 
Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003); Bowen v. Amoco 
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 938 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 136. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (finding that parties may 
not contractually broaden the scope of judicial vacatur for arbitration awards because the grounds 
for vacatur in the Federal Arbitration Act are exclusive). 
 137. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Altering Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 2006 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 235, 256–57. 
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One scholar has suggested that the answer to this is yes.138  Unlike the FAA, 
which provides for specific grounds for vacatur,139 the LMRA has no such 
provision.140  Because the LMRA has no specific grounds for vacatur, the 
Supreme Court would not have the same concern of parties circumnavigating 
the express grounds for vacatur as it does in the FAA context.  Additionally, a 
labor collective bargaining agreement is an ongoing negotiation, where the 
parties may correct any errors along the way, thus further supporting the 
proposition that collective bargaining agreements can be contractually altered to 
increase the level of judicial review.141 
The problem with this thesis, however, lies in the dicta of a Seventh Circuit 
decision,142 where the court stated “[i]f the parties want, they can contract for an 
appellate arbitration panel to review the arbitrator’s award.  But they cannot 
contract for judicial review of that award; federal jurisdiction cannot be created 
by contract.”143  While this statement is only dicta and not binding, it casts doubt 
on the proposition that courts would be open to such a system. 
Another substantial obstacle to an approach like this is that it undermines the 
longstanding judicial policy to refrain from reviewing the merits of awards.  The 
policy to refrain from second-guessing arbitrators has been deeply rooted in the 
American court system since its founding.144  Even as the court system 
experienced a tremendous shift towards favoring arbitration beginning with 
Lincoln Mills and the Steelworker Trilogy cases,145 the policy to refrain from 
reviewing the merits of an award remained consistent.  By allowing parties to 
contractually alter the level of judicial review of arbitration awards, and even 
agree to allow judges to review the merits of awards, the Court would be going 
against jurisprudence that it has firmly held for over a century, and would permit 
private parties to circumnavigate the public policy that prohibits judicial review 
of the merits of arbitration awards. 
                                                 
 138. Id. at  264. 
 139. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)(4). 
 140. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
 141. Rubinstein, supra note 137, at 265.  “Additionally, because the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement are engaged in a continuing relationship and are free to correct any perceived 
errors or mistakes that an arbitrator may make by negotiating a new collective bargaining 
agreement, it  is logical to permit parties to alter judicial review of a labor arbitration award under 
Section 301.”  Id. 
 142. Chi. Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 143. Id. at  1505 (emphasis in original). 
 144. See supra note 66. 
 145. See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
596 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 –68 (1960); Textile 
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). 
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B. Why Collective Bargaining Would Cure the Essence Test Fumble 
Even with doubt looming over the validity of contractual alterations of judicial 
review, such a method would be in the interest of clarity and efficiency and is 
therefore a legitimate approach.  A contractually-agreed-to expanded scope of 
judicial review would allow a reviewing court to examine the merits of an 
arbitration award by looking for errors of law or fact, and ultimately determine 
that an award fails to draw its essence from the agreement if there is such an 
error of law or fact.  Such a judicial vacatur would appear to be consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s policy favoring the intention of the parties in negotiating 
their arbitration provisions because the contract would demonstrate the intention 
of the parties to have a court review findings of law and fact.146  This mechanism 
would allow reviewing courts to apply the essence test and eliminate the paradox 
created by the essence test and conflicting mandate to refrain from reviewing the 
merits of the arbitration awards.147 
The usefulness of this solution can be seen in a hypothetical using the facts 
from the Peterson case.148  If the NFL collective bargaining agreement contained 
a provision that allowed for a reviewing judge to review arbitration awards for 
“errors of law or of fact,”149 then it is very unlikely that the Eighth Circuit would 
have overturned the District Court.  The District Court held that the arbitrator’s 
award ignored the “law of the shop” and failed to draw its essence from the 
agreement because it retroactively applied a new personal conduct policy to 
Peterson.150  Retired Federal Judge Barbara Jones held in the Rice arbitration 
that the NFL could not retroactively apply the policy to a player.151  The District 
Court found that the arbitrator committed an error of fact by distinguishing the 
Rice case from the Peterson case, finding “no valid basis to distinguish this case 
from the Rice matter.”152  Accordingly, the District Court went on to overturn 
the arbitration award relying, in part, on this factual finding that Rice and 
Peterson were indistinguishable.153 
                                                 
 146. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567–68 (“The function of the court is very limited when the 
parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. . . . Whether 
the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 147. See generally Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 357 
F.3d 272, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 148. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (D. Minn. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 149. Younger, supra note 134, at 254. 
 150. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 109091. 
 151. Barbara S. Jones, In the Matter of Ray Rice, ESPN (Nov. 28, 2014), 
http://www.espn.com/pdf/2014/1128/141128_rice-summary.pdf. (“Recognizing that even under 
the broad deference afforded to [the Commissioner] through Article 46 [of the collective bargaining 
agreement], he could not retroactively apply the new presumptive penalty to Rice . . . . “ ). 
 152. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
 153. Id. 
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On appeal, it is very likely that the Eighth Circuit would have upheld the 
District Court’s decision on the grounds that the collective bargaining agreement 
allowed for judicial review of factual errors, and on the grounds that circuit 
courts frequently defer to lower courts on matters of factual findings.154  In this 
type of scenario, the ability to contractually expand the scope of judicial review 
of arbitration could have been extremely beneficial for Peterson and other 
similarly situated parties. 
Circuit and lower courts are already reviewing the merits of arbitration 
awards, despite the Supreme Court’s express prohibition.155  Some courts have 
utilized the essence test, applying various interpretations and meanings, to 
overturn arbitration awards based on the underlying merits of the case.156  The 
inability of lower courts to resist reviewing the merits of an arbitration award is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that courts, on a daily basis, review the merits of 
claims.  This is their function as judges.  For a judge to suppress his basic instinct 
merely because this type of cases happens to come from arbitration can be 
difficult.  In fact, such a scenario was seen in the Peterson case.157 
In the Peterson case, the District Court effectively reviewed the merits of the 
arbitration award under the guise of the essence test.158  The District Court found 
that the Peterson case was not distinguishable from Rice,159 and that by ignoring 
the law of the shop the arbitration award did not draw its essence from the 
agreement.160  The Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected this argument and 
conclusion.161  The Eighth Circuit gave credit to the arbitrator’s finding that the 
new personal conduct policy was not a change of the previous policy, but more 
of a clarification of discipline, and therefore was not a retroactive application to 
                                                 
 154. See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. Lay Siok Lin, 423 Fed. App’x 106, 106 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 
defer to factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous.”); Xiong Dong v. 
Attorney General of U.S., 257 F. App’x 513, 515 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We also defer to factual 
findings.”); Cruz v. Miller, No. 92-3141, 1993 WL 83427, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 1993) (“[W]e 
defer to factual findings of state courts.”). 
 155. See Nicholas J. Zidik, Sitting as “Superarbitrators” or According “Great Deference?”  
Pennsylvania Courts and the Essence Test Under PERA Since State System of Higher Education 
(Cheyney University) v. State College and University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 41 
DUQ. L. REV. 579, 582 (2003) (discussing the different iterations of the essence test and its use by 
the courts to overturn decisions it  does not agree with). 
 156. See State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Prof ’l Ass’n (PSEA-
NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999) (discussing the use of less deferential standards of the essence 
test and its ability to empower courts to become “superarbitrator[s]” to “vacate an award when it 
finds that the award is at odds with how the members of the court would have decided the case.”). 
 157. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1091 (D. Minn. 
2015), rev’d and remanded NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
 158. See NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 1091. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. NFL Players Ass’n ex rel. Peterson, 831 F.3d at 994. 
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Peterson.162  The Eighth Circuit reminded the District Court that judicial review 
is forbidden from reaching the merits of an award, even if based on factual 
errors.163  Additionally, the Eighth Circuit went on to say that, “[a]n erroneous 
interpretation of a contract, including the law of the shop, is not a sufficient basis 
for disregarding the conclusion of the [arbitrator].”164 
The Peterson case is just one example of lower courts using the essence test 
to review the merits of arbitration awards, and to overturn those awards.  In this 
sense, the essence test seems unworkable.  In fact, one scholar suggests that even 
if the Supreme Court were to add more language to clarify the essence test, it 
would be of little help.165  He suggested that judges have an innate instinct to act 
like judges, namely, to review facts for errors and to apply the correct legal 
standards.166  And, that it may even be “foolhardy” to believe that judges can 
resist the temptation to overturn awards in light of clear errors of law or fact.167  
It therefore makes even more sense to allow parties to contractually alter judicial 
standards of review. 
By allowing parties to contractually agree to alter standards of judicial review, 
the Supreme Court could perhaps add guiding principles to the essence test that 
the lower courts may actually follow.  If an arbitrator’s decision rests on factual 
or legal errors, and the collective bargaining agreement allows for judicial 
review of factual and legal errors, then a judge could hold that the award failed 
to draw its essence from the agreement because it rested on factual or legal 
errors.  This outcome would be in line with the parties’ intentions, and would 
provide an opportunity to make the essence test and the prohibition on merit 
review compatible. 
V. GETTING CONGRESS INVOLVED: ADDING TO THE LABOR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS ACT  
An alternative avenue to eliminate the continued use of the essence test as an 
impermissible vehicle to review merits of arbitration awards would be for 
Congress to create specific grounds for vacatur similar to those in the FAA.168 
                                                 
 162. Id. at  994–95 (“The arbitrator, having been presented with the Commissioner’s 
statements, concluded that the August 2014 communications did not constitute a change of the 
Personal Conduct Policy.  He necessarily found, therefore, that Goodell’s statements were not 
admissions to the contrary.  Courts are not permitted to review the merits of an arbitration decision 
even when a party claims that the decision rests on factual errors.”). 
 163. Id. at  995. 
 164. Id. at  994. 
 165. Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 
80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274 (1980) (“ [I]t is apparent that this judicial instinct [to interpret and 
apply standards codified in contracts, regulations, and statutes] will not be stifled by incantations 
of finality, or by still more verbal formulations of the proper scope of review.”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Benetar, supra note 50, at 81. 
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Following the language of the specific grounds for vacatur in the FAA would 
be a good starting point.  In fact, some scholars have suggested that the grounds 
listed in the FAA are essentially the same common law grounds for vacatur 
already created for labor arbitration.169  Indeed, there is a legitimate argument to 
be made that FAA section 10(a)(4) is analogous to the Supreme Court’s essence 
test, including the Supreme Court’s prohibition against merit review of 
arbitration awards.170 
But arbitration under the FAA and labor arbitration under the LMRA are 
inherently different.  The purposes of arbitration under the FAA and LMRA are 
“distinct processes, arising in mutually exclusive environments and serving 
different purposes.”171  What works in the context of, for example, commercial 
arbitration under the FAA, may not be sufficient in labor arbitration under the 
LMRA. 
As stated above, parties to a collective bargaining agreement are engaged in a 
business negotiation.172  Labor relations and collective bargaining agreements 
entail ongoing negotiations that are mutually beneficial to all parties.  The 
relationship between employer and employee, and the terms of employment, are 
unique to such an extent that it should be afforded a different set of standards 
than those prescribed under the FAA.  Accordingly, FAA section 10(a)(4)173 is 
a good starting point to begin to encompass the essence test, but it should be 
broadened to allow for review of errors of law or fact as well, such as providing 
the “vacatur of arbitration awards that fail to draw their essence from the 
agreement” and that “awards fail to draw their essence from the agreement when 
they are based on an erroneous interpretation of law or fact.” 
VI. WHY A MODERN SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO REVISIT THE ESSENCE TEST  
This is a current issue for labor arbitration disputes that requires the Supreme 
Court’s immediate attention.  Labor arbitration is “the primary method utilized 
by public and private employers and unions to solve disputes that arise in the 
workplace under labor agreements.”174  The Court in the Steelworker Trilogy175 
cases may not have anticipated the prevalence of labor arbitration in today’s 
                                                 
 169. Hayford, supra note 54, at 563 (“The substance of sub-sections (a)(1)–(3) [of the FAA 
§10], sanctioning vacatur for serious acts of party, advocate, and arbitrator misconduct is already 
reflected, to a limited extent, in the labor arbitration case law.”). 
 170. Id. at  565–66 (noting that § 10(a)(4) allows vacatur when an arbitrator “exceeded their 
powers,” but that even under this standard a reviewing court must defer to the arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the law, the contract, and findings of fact).  
 171. Stephen L. Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for 
Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 51 DISP . RESOL. J. 22, 83 (1996). 
 172. See supra note 141. 
 173. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
 174. A Practical Guide to Grievance Arbitration, supra note 1, at 1. 
 175. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigat ion Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
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industries.  A modern Supreme Court should review the policy considerations 
of the Steelworker Trilogy Court against reviewing the merits of awards, and ask 
themselves, considering the prevalence of labor arbitration, is it better public 
policy to encourage the finality of arbitration, or to get the issue correct? 
Moreover, labor arbitration under the LMRA is dependent on case law to 
continue developing, especially in the context of vacaturs.176  In order for there 
to be a uniform application of the essence test, the Supreme Court must grant 
certiorari to more labor arbitration cases.  If the Supreme Court does not hear 
more labor arbitration cases, the essence test will continue down a path of 
confusion and frustration. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the Steelworker Trilogy cases, the essence test has become increasingly 
unworkable.  The Peterson case is just one recent example of the disagreement 
between circuit and lower courts on the applicability of the essence test.  It 
demonstrated the seeming incompatibility with the Court’s mandate to refrain 
from reviewing the merits of arbitration awards. 
The Supreme Court can eliminate mass confusion and discrepancies among 
the circuits as to the essence test’s application and meaning by allowing parties 
to contractually agree to altered standards of judicial review to allow for vacaturs 
based on things like factual or legal errors.  While this approach is not without 
its difficulties, this method would be in line with the parties’ intentions, and 
allow the courts to avoid the confusing doctrine of the essence test.  It would 
represent sound public policy by allowing parties to freely bargain in labor 
agreements, and increase the overall efficiency of judicial review of arbitration.  
Additionally, this same result could be accomplished through legislation 
amending the LMRA.  Specific grounds for vacatur, similar to those in the FAA,  
but including vacatur based on errors of law or fact, would eliminate the need 
for the common-law essence test, while continuing to honor LMRA and FAA 












                                                 
 176. The LMRA does not have specific grounds for vacatur. 
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